Would DES be secure with 128 bit keys?
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Assuming you only modify the key schedule so that each of a 128-bit key is used at least once, would DES be about as secure as other ciphers such as AES? I am not talking about 2DES/3DES or other drawbacks like performance etc.
des
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add a comment |
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Assuming you only modify the key schedule so that each of a 128-bit key is used at least once, would DES be about as secure as other ciphers such as AES? I am not talking about 2DES/3DES or other drawbacks like performance etc.
des
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4
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You should also define the new key schedule. When parameters changed, It usually requires new design and analysis. See AES-128 vs AES-256.
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– kelalaka
Feb 18 at 17:08
1
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One could take this question to be about Lucifer, or about Lucifer with the S-boxes as modified by the NSA to make them resist differential cryptanalysis.
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– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 18 at 17:32
add a comment |
$begingroup$
Assuming you only modify the key schedule so that each of a 128-bit key is used at least once, would DES be about as secure as other ciphers such as AES? I am not talking about 2DES/3DES or other drawbacks like performance etc.
des
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Assuming you only modify the key schedule so that each of a 128-bit key is used at least once, would DES be about as secure as other ciphers such as AES? I am not talking about 2DES/3DES or other drawbacks like performance etc.
des
des
edited Feb 18 at 17:06
kelalaka
8,43822351
8,43822351
asked Feb 18 at 16:23
enigma969enigma969
183
183
4
$begingroup$
You should also define the new key schedule. When parameters changed, It usually requires new design and analysis. See AES-128 vs AES-256.
$endgroup$
– kelalaka
Feb 18 at 17:08
1
$begingroup$
One could take this question to be about Lucifer, or about Lucifer with the S-boxes as modified by the NSA to make them resist differential cryptanalysis.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 18 at 17:32
add a comment |
4
$begingroup$
You should also define the new key schedule. When parameters changed, It usually requires new design and analysis. See AES-128 vs AES-256.
$endgroup$
– kelalaka
Feb 18 at 17:08
1
$begingroup$
One could take this question to be about Lucifer, or about Lucifer with the S-boxes as modified by the NSA to make them resist differential cryptanalysis.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 18 at 17:32
4
4
$begingroup$
You should also define the new key schedule. When parameters changed, It usually requires new design and analysis. See AES-128 vs AES-256.
$endgroup$
– kelalaka
Feb 18 at 17:08
$begingroup$
You should also define the new key schedule. When parameters changed, It usually requires new design and analysis. See AES-128 vs AES-256.
$endgroup$
– kelalaka
Feb 18 at 17:08
1
1
$begingroup$
One could take this question to be about Lucifer, or about Lucifer with the S-boxes as modified by the NSA to make them resist differential cryptanalysis.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 18 at 17:32
$begingroup$
One could take this question to be about Lucifer, or about Lucifer with the S-boxes as modified by the NSA to make them resist differential cryptanalysis.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 18 at 17:32
add a comment |
1 Answer
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No, DES* (which I'll call your "DES modified to use 128 bit keys") would not be as secure as AES; two reasons spring immediately to mind:
Block size; DES* would still have 64 bit blocks; most block cipher modes start to leak information when you get close to the birthday bound; for DES*, that'd be 32Gigabytes, which isn't that long for common use. In contrast, AES (which has a 128 bit block size) has a birthday bound of circa 300Exabytes
Linear cryptanalysis; DES is known to be weak against linear cryptanalysis; depending on how you map the 128 bit keys to the DES* subkeys, DES* may very well be as well. Of course, AES is known to be immune to linear cryptanalysis
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3
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And that's already enough reason not to go for 128 bit DES, ignoring the less serious issues such as parity bits, weak keys and what-not.
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– Maarten Bodewes♦
Feb 18 at 17:10
add a comment |
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1 Answer
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No, DES* (which I'll call your "DES modified to use 128 bit keys") would not be as secure as AES; two reasons spring immediately to mind:
Block size; DES* would still have 64 bit blocks; most block cipher modes start to leak information when you get close to the birthday bound; for DES*, that'd be 32Gigabytes, which isn't that long for common use. In contrast, AES (which has a 128 bit block size) has a birthday bound of circa 300Exabytes
Linear cryptanalysis; DES is known to be weak against linear cryptanalysis; depending on how you map the 128 bit keys to the DES* subkeys, DES* may very well be as well. Of course, AES is known to be immune to linear cryptanalysis
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3
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And that's already enough reason not to go for 128 bit DES, ignoring the less serious issues such as parity bits, weak keys and what-not.
$endgroup$
– Maarten Bodewes♦
Feb 18 at 17:10
add a comment |
$begingroup$
No, DES* (which I'll call your "DES modified to use 128 bit keys") would not be as secure as AES; two reasons spring immediately to mind:
Block size; DES* would still have 64 bit blocks; most block cipher modes start to leak information when you get close to the birthday bound; for DES*, that'd be 32Gigabytes, which isn't that long for common use. In contrast, AES (which has a 128 bit block size) has a birthday bound of circa 300Exabytes
Linear cryptanalysis; DES is known to be weak against linear cryptanalysis; depending on how you map the 128 bit keys to the DES* subkeys, DES* may very well be as well. Of course, AES is known to be immune to linear cryptanalysis
$endgroup$
3
$begingroup$
And that's already enough reason not to go for 128 bit DES, ignoring the less serious issues such as parity bits, weak keys and what-not.
$endgroup$
– Maarten Bodewes♦
Feb 18 at 17:10
add a comment |
$begingroup$
No, DES* (which I'll call your "DES modified to use 128 bit keys") would not be as secure as AES; two reasons spring immediately to mind:
Block size; DES* would still have 64 bit blocks; most block cipher modes start to leak information when you get close to the birthday bound; for DES*, that'd be 32Gigabytes, which isn't that long for common use. In contrast, AES (which has a 128 bit block size) has a birthday bound of circa 300Exabytes
Linear cryptanalysis; DES is known to be weak against linear cryptanalysis; depending on how you map the 128 bit keys to the DES* subkeys, DES* may very well be as well. Of course, AES is known to be immune to linear cryptanalysis
$endgroup$
No, DES* (which I'll call your "DES modified to use 128 bit keys") would not be as secure as AES; two reasons spring immediately to mind:
Block size; DES* would still have 64 bit blocks; most block cipher modes start to leak information when you get close to the birthday bound; for DES*, that'd be 32Gigabytes, which isn't that long for common use. In contrast, AES (which has a 128 bit block size) has a birthday bound of circa 300Exabytes
Linear cryptanalysis; DES is known to be weak against linear cryptanalysis; depending on how you map the 128 bit keys to the DES* subkeys, DES* may very well be as well. Of course, AES is known to be immune to linear cryptanalysis
answered Feb 18 at 16:53
ponchoponcho
93k2145241
93k2145241
3
$begingroup$
And that's already enough reason not to go for 128 bit DES, ignoring the less serious issues such as parity bits, weak keys and what-not.
$endgroup$
– Maarten Bodewes♦
Feb 18 at 17:10
add a comment |
3
$begingroup$
And that's already enough reason not to go for 128 bit DES, ignoring the less serious issues such as parity bits, weak keys and what-not.
$endgroup$
– Maarten Bodewes♦
Feb 18 at 17:10
3
3
$begingroup$
And that's already enough reason not to go for 128 bit DES, ignoring the less serious issues such as parity bits, weak keys and what-not.
$endgroup$
– Maarten Bodewes♦
Feb 18 at 17:10
$begingroup$
And that's already enough reason not to go for 128 bit DES, ignoring the less serious issues such as parity bits, weak keys and what-not.
$endgroup$
– Maarten Bodewes♦
Feb 18 at 17:10
add a comment |
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$begingroup$
You should also define the new key schedule. When parameters changed, It usually requires new design and analysis. See AES-128 vs AES-256.
$endgroup$
– kelalaka
Feb 18 at 17:08
1
$begingroup$
One could take this question to be about Lucifer, or about Lucifer with the S-boxes as modified by the NSA to make them resist differential cryptanalysis.
$endgroup$
– Squeamish Ossifrage
Feb 18 at 17:32